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ABSTRACT
Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, most U.S. taxpayers
received a tax rebate between July and September, 2001. The week in which the rebate was mailed
was based on the second-to-last digit of the taxpayer's Social Security number, a digit that is
effectively randomly assigned. Using special questions about the rebates added to the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, we exploit this historically unique experiment to measure the change in
consumption expenditures caused by receipt of the rebate and to test the Permanent Income
Hypothesis and related models. We find that households spent about 20-40 percent of their rebates
on non-durable goods during the three-month period in which their rebates were received, and
roughly another third of their rebates during the subsequent three-month period. The implied effects
on  aggregate  consumption  demand  are  significant.  The  estimated  responses  are  largest  for
households with relatively low liquid wealth and low income, consistent with liquidity constraints.
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Policymakers often try to use tax policy to reduce the magnitude of economic 
fluctuations. They cut income taxes in recessions, assuming that the resulting increase in 
disposable income increases household spending, thereby reducing the severity of recessions. 
Academic economists, however, tend to be more skeptical about the use of tax policy to 
stabilize economic fluctuations, in large part because the canonical theory of the consumer 
suggests that consumption should not respond much to temporary changes in taxes, such as a 
one-time tax rebate. Instead, any increase in consumption in response to a tax cut should in 
theory be spread out over consumers’ entire lifetimes (or forever), which implies only a small 
change in spending in the short-term after a tax cut. Moreover, consumption should increase 
as soon as consumers learn of an upcoming tax cut, before their disposable income actually 
rises.   
This paper uses unique data and features of the 2001 income tax rebates to estimate the 
causal effect of these rebates on household expenditure. The Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 sent tax rebates, typically $300 or $600 in value, to about 
two-thirds of U.S. households over a ten-week period from late July to the end of September, 
2001. The unique feature of these rebates is that the timing of the mailing of each rebate was 
based on the second-to-last digit of the Social Security number of the tax filer who received 
it, a digit that is effectively randomly assigned.
1 
The unique data that we use is part of the Consumer Expenditure (CE) Survey, which, 
among large household surveys in the U.S., contains the most comprehensive measures of 
households’ expenditures. The regular CE data does not contain sufficient information to 
study the 2001 tax rebates. In particular, the ongoing CE survey does not record the timing of 
taxes and transfers, nor the Social Security numbers of households’ tax filers. However, 
shortly after the passage of the 2001 Tax Act, the authors worked with the staff of the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) and other government agencies to add a special module of 
questions about the tax rebates to the Survey. This module asked households about the timing 
and amount of each rebate check they received, and was included in the survey from shortly 
                                                 
1The last four digits of a Social Security number (SSN) are assigned sequentially to applicants within 
geographic areas (which determine the first three digits of the SSN) and a “group” (the middle two digits of 
the SSN). The main reason for this staggered disbursement schedule is that it was difficult in practice to 
print and mail the rebate checks all at once. Accordingly, the disbursement schedule was keyed to the 
randomized social security digit for purposes of fairness.   2
after the rebate mailing began until the end of 2001. This is the first paper to use the new tax 
rebate module and exploit the randomized timing of the rebates in the CE. 
We estimate the change in household expenditures due to rebate receipt by comparing the 
expenditures of households who received rebates at different times. The natural experiment 
provided by the randomized mailing dates allows us to directly identify the causal effect of 
the rebate. While our results can be interpreted as a test of the Permanent Income Hypothesis 
(PIH) and related models, the experiment provides identification under much weaker 
assumptions than required in previous tests of the PIH that rely on the time-series properties 
of the consumption Euler equation. 
We begin our analysis using all of the available information about the rebates, including 
the magnitudes of the rebates, and all available CE households. We then progressively reduce 
the variation that we utilize, until we are left with only variation in the timing of when 
households received their rebates, conditional on receiving a rebate. Given the structure of 
the data, this leads to progressively smaller samples and less power, with large standard 
errors in our final specifications. Nonetheless, all of the results suggest that the rebates 
caused an economically significant increase in spending. 
Summarizing the main results, the average household spent about 20-40% of its 2001 tax 
rebate on nondurable goods during the three-month period in which the rebate was received, 
depending on the specification. We also find evidence of additional, smaller but still 
substantial, lagged effects on spending. Roughly two-thirds of the rebate was spent during 
the quarter of receipt and subsequent three-month period. Any additional lagged effects on 
spending cannot be estimated with precision. 
To shed light on the reasons behind the estimated increase in spending, we contrast the 
spending responses across different types of households and different subcategories of 
nondurable goods. Households with low levels of liquid assets and low income spent 
significantly more of the rebate than typical, consistent with their facing liquidity constraints. 
While not statistically significant, the point estimates also suggest somewhat larger responses 
among those with high levels of liquid assets and high income (relative to households with 
intermediate levels of assets and income). Finally, we also find some evidence that 
expenditures on food away from home, apparel, and personal care and miscellaneous items 
responded disproportionately strongly to the rebate.   3
Given that the Treasury distributed 38 billion dollars in tax rebates, our estimates imply 
that the rebates directly increased aggregate consumption expenditures by about 0.8 percent 
in the third quarter of 2001 and 0.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2001. The ultimate effects 
of the rebate on the economy also depend on other factors beyond the scope of this paper, 
such as the extent to which the increased demand for consumption goods caused the relative 
price of current goods to increase and/or had a multiplier effect. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section relates our paper to the prior 
literature. The third section describes the relevant tax law changes and the fourth our use of 
the CE Survey data. The fifth section discusses our empirical methodology. The sixth section 
presents our main results regarding the short-run response to the rebate, while the seventh 
section examines the lagged response. The eighth section examines differences in the 
response across different types of households and consumption goods. A final section 
discusses the aggregate impact of the rebates and concludes. Appendixes contain additional 
information about the data. 
 
II. The Literature 
Previous tests of consumption smoothing have often had trouble identifying predictable 
(or transitory versus permanent) changes in income, and separating the effect of a change in 
income from other factors concurrently impacting the consumption decision (e.g., changes in 
monetary policy or the stock market). They also usually required the assumption that the 
characteristics of a household that determine the size or timing of its income change be 
uncorrelated with other reasons for differential consumption growth rates.
2 By contrast, the 
random variation in the timing of the 2001 tax rebates avoids these recurrent problems. 
Research using aggregate data to measure whether tax cuts increase consumption 
expenditures has had difficulty distinguishing the effects of the tax cuts themselves from the 
economic changes that led to the tax cuts, as well as other concurrent macroeconomic factors. 
Due also in part to the limited number of significant changes in tax policy, there is a lack of 
consensus about the effects of tax rebates and other tax changes on consumption 
                                                 
2For example, in his paper discussed below, Ronald G. Bodkin was aware that his insurance dividend 
variable might have been picking up the correlation of the dividend with omitted variables in turn 
correlated with permanent income. On adding such control variables to Bodkin's original regression, Roger 
C. Bird and Bodkin (1965) found smaller spending responses.     4
expenditures (see Franco Modigliani and Charles Steindel (1977), Alan S. Blinder (1981), 
Blinder and Angus Deaton (1985), James M. Poterba (1988), and David W. Wilcox (1990)).
3  
Our paper builds more directly on the literature using micro data to test whether expected 
or transitory changes in household income affect household consumption expenditures (see 
the surveys by Deaton (1992) and Martin Browning and Annamaria Lusardi (1996)). The 
seminal studies of Ronald G. Bodkin (1959) and Mordechai E. Kreinin (1961) examined 
windfalls like insurance dividends to WWII veterans and German restitution payments. More 
recently, Jonathan A. Parker (1999), Nicholas S. Souleles (1999, 2002), and Chang-Tai Hsieh 
(2003) study more directly changes in fiscal policy and use larger, more representative 
samples.
4  
Two other papers study the impact of the 2001 tax rebates on household spending. Using 
innovative questions added to the Michigan Survey of Consumers, Matthew D. Shapiro and 
Joel B. Slemrod (2003) found that only 21.8% of respondents who received (or expected to 
receive) a rebate report that they will mostly spend their rebate. They calculate that this result 
is consistent with an average marginal propensity to consume of about one third, very close 
to the present paper’s estimate of the short-run response of expenditures. However, they find 
no evidence that liquidity constraints play a role in this response and no evidence of a lagged 
effect on expenditures.
5  
                                                 
3Modigliani and Steindel, Blinder, and Poterba studied the 1975 tax rebate. They found that consumption 
expenditures responded too much to the rebate, though they came to somewhat different conclusions 
regarding the relative magnitude of the initial versus lagged response. Blinder and Deaton (1985) found 
smaller consumption responses when they considered jointly the 1975 rebate along with the 1968-70 tax 
surcharge. Nonetheless they found consumption to be too sensitive to the pre-announced changes in taxes 
in the later phases of the Reagan tax cuts. They note that their mixed results are “probably not precise 
enough to persuade anyone to abandon strongly held a priori views”. 
4Souleles (1999) found that spending responds significantly to the federal income tax refunds that most 
taxpayers receive each spring. Hsieh found smaller responses by Alaskans to their oil rebates than to their 
federal income tax refunds. Parker found that household spending responded significantly to changes in 
take-home pay that occurred for high-income households that hit the Social Security tax cap. Other related 
studies include Wilcox (1989), Shapiro and Slemrod (1995), John Shea (1995), Souleles (2000), Browning 
and M. Delores Collado (2001), David Gross and Souleles (2002), and Melvin Stephens Jr. (2003), among 
others. 
5Of the 78% of respondents who report they will mostly save their rebate, the majority (about three-fifths) 
report that they will mostly pay down debt (as opposed to accumulate assets). Shapiro and Slemrod (2002, 
forthcoming) used a novel follow-up survey in 2002 to try to determine whether there was a lagged 
response to the rebate. They found that, of respondents who said they initially mostly used the rebate to pay 
down debt, most report that they will “try to keep [down their] lower debt for at least a year.” They found 
similar results for those who report they will save by accumulating assets.   5
A concurrent paper by Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, and Souleles (2004) also exploits the 
random timing of the rebate mailing, to identify the dynamic response of credit-card 
payments, spending, and debt to the rebates. They find that households initially used some of 
their rebates to increase credit card payments and thereby pay down debt, but soon 
afterwards credit card spending rose such that debt returned back near its pre-rebate levels. 
These dynamics of spending are consistent with the dynamics we find in this paper. This 
paper complements Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2004) by estimating the magnitude of the 
effect of the rebate on nondurable expenditure, not just credit card spending.
6 
 
III. The 2001 Tax Rebates 
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 enacted substantial 
reductions in personal and estate tax rates, which were forecasted to reduce revenues by 
around 10 trillion dollars over ten years. The Tax Act reduced the income tax rate applied to 
income in the lowest income tax bracket from 15 percent to 10 percent, with this change 
applied retroactively to income earned from the start of 2001. The tax rebates represented an 
advance payment of this tax cut. The first income tax bracket applied to the first $6,000 of 
income for a single individual filing a return, and to the first $12,000 of income for a married 
couple filing jointly, so that, of the approximately two-thirds of U.S. households that 
received a rebate, most received rebates of $300 or $600. The Internal Revenue Service 
determined the rebate amounts for each tax filer based on his or her year 2000 tax return. 
We exploit two key features of the rebate disbursement. First, and more importantly, the 
rebate checks were not mailed all at once, but rather in different weeks that were randomly 
assigned to households, as described in the introduction. Thus, the date at which each 
household received its rebate is independent of other household characteristics.
7 Second, 
                                                 
6That is, their credit card dataset does not record spending via cash or checks, nor spending on other credit 
cards held by the account-holders in their data. Also, it does not record whether a card-holder actually 
received a rebate. Agarwal, Liu and Souleles identify the timing of rebate receipt based on an indicator of 
the corresponding randomized digit of the card-holder’s SSN. However they note that the card-holder 
might not be the tax filer (whose SSN determined the actual timing of receipt), and that some card-holding 
households did not receive a rebate at all. Agarwal, Liu and Souleles attribute the slight delay before credit 
card spending rises to a couple of features particular to credit cards; e.g., the need for constrained card-
holders (those whose balances start near their credit limits) to first make payments before they can spend 
using their cards, and to the delay before payments and spending register on the credit card statement. 
7 One potential exception is that a household that filed its year 2000 tax return late may have been mailed 
its rebate after the ten-week period of randomized disbursement ended in September.
 Since 92 percent of   6
Congress passed the Tax Act in May, 2001, and of course expectations of some tax cut arose 
even earlier.
8 Given this, our empirical methodology allows the rebates to be treated as pre-
announced. This distinction matters for interpreting the results as a test of the PIH, but not for 
measuring per se the effect of the rebates on expenditure.
9 
 
In aggregate, the 2001 tax rebates totaled 38 billion dollars, and so represent about 1.5 
percent of GDP, and 2.2 percent of aggregate personal consumption expenditures, in the third 
quarter of 2001. The rebates were the dominant component (about 84%) of the tax cuts 
implemented in the first year of the Tax Act. The timing of the remaining, smaller 
components in 2001 is independent of the randomized timing of the rebates analyzed here. 
For more details about the Tax Act, see Alan J. Auerbach (2002), Donald Kiefer et al. 
(2002), and Shapiro and Slemrod (2003; 2002, forthcoming). 
 
IV. The Consumer Expenditure Survey 
The CE interview survey contains detailed measures of the expenditures of a large, 
stratified random sample of U.S. households. CE households are interviewed four times, 
three months apart. In each interview the households report their expenditures during the 
preceding three months. New households are added to the survey every month so that the 
data are effectively monthly in frequency. In addition to surveying households about their 
expenditures, the CE also gathers some information about their demographic characteristics, 
income, and wealth. 
                                                                                                                                                 
taxpayers typically file at or before the normal April 15
th deadline (Slemrod et al. (1997)),
 this non-
randomized source of variation from the previous year is small and likely to be exogenous to the rebate. We 
present results below that exclude rebates received late in 2001. 
8 Indeed, tax cuts were a central element of George W. Bush’s platform in the 2000 election. Moreover, the 
Treasury sent taxpayers a letter shortly in advance of the rebate informing them of the size of their 
upcoming rebate and the particular week in which it would be disbursed: “We are pleased to inform you … 
you will be receiving a check in the amount of $[amount] during the week of [mm/dd/yy].” 
9 We focus on the behavior of expenditure after rebate receipt. A not-mutually-exclusive alternative 
empirical approach would be to try to estimate the expected effect of the tax cuts on permanent income, 
even before actual rebate receipt. However, such an approach would be much harder to implement, as 
discussed below. First, the passage of the Tax Act per se cannot be separated from aggregate effects 
captured by time dummies, such as seasonality. It does not provide randomized cross-sectional variation 
that one can exploit, unlike the timing of rebate receipt. Second, it is unclear how large and permanent 
consumers actually expected the tax cuts to be (see the survey evidence in Shapiro and Slemrod, 2003). 
Third, consumers’ expectations of tax-cut induced changes in their permanent income would have evolved 
over time, starting at least as early as the 2000 election campaign. (E.g., there is no single point in time at 
which the tax cut went from being entirely unexpected to being entirely expected.)     7
The special module of questions about the 2001 rebates covers the crucial period during 
which and after the rebates were mailed: the module went into the field in the second week of 
August, and remained there through the end of December. The new questions asked 
households whether they received a rebate, how many rebate checks they received, and then 
the month and amount of each check received. These questions were asked at the end of the 
CE interview, after households completed their usual reporting of consumption expenditures 
and other information. The questions were written so as to be consistent with the style of 
other CE questions. Appendix A contains the survey instrument. Appendix B describes how 
we construct from the raw data the measures used below of the rebates received in each 
three-month expenditure reference-period. The response rate to the new module was rather 
good. Only about 3% of the rebate amounts were flagged as invalidly missing (e.g., ‘don’t 
knows’ or refusals), and only about another 4% of the months-of-receipt were flagged as 
invalidly missing. 
We focus on three measures of consumption expenditures. First, we study expenditures 
on food, which include food consumed away from home, food consumed at home, and 
purchases of alcoholic beverages. Much previous research has studied expenditures on food, 
largely because of its availability in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, but it is a narrow 
measure of expenditures. Our second and main measure of consumption expenditures is 
nondurable expenditures (broadly defined). However, the NIPA definition of nondurable 
goods includes some semi-durables like apparel. Hence we also consider a third, intermediate 
definition of consumption expenditures, nondurable goods strictly defined, following Lusardi 
(1996). In preliminary analysis we also considered a fourth definition, BLS total 
expenditures, including durable expenditures like auto and truck purchases. However the 
response of total expenditures to the rebates was never statistically significant. This is not 
surprising. The rebates are small relative to the cost of autos and trucks and, more 
importantly, including expenditures on durable goods dramatically increases the variability 
of the dependent variable and decreases precision in estimation.
10 Thus, in keeping with 
previous research, we focus on nondurable expenditures.
11  
                                                 
10Also, the introduction of zero-percent auto financing during our sample period significantly altered 
expenditures on autos.  
11Generalizing across specifications, estimates of the effect of the tax rebate on total expenditures are 
measured with a standard error about four times the size of that on nondurable goods, and the point   8
Our baseline sample uses the 2000 and 2001 waves of the CE survey, with the sample 
period starting with interviews in January 2001 (when period t+1 in equation (2) below 
covers expenditures in October 2000 to December 2000) and running through interviews in 
March 2002 (when period t+1 covers December 2001 to February of 2002). Where 
mentioned, we extend this baseline sample period by adding data from the 2002 wave
in order to allow for additional lags of the rebate in the analysis. The sample includes 
only households that had at least one interview during the period in which the tax rebate
module was in the field. Also, we drop from our sample any households with implausibly
low expenditures (the bottom 1% of nondurable expenditures), unusually large changes 
in age or family size, and uncertain tax rebate status. Appendix B describes our data and 
sample in more detail. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our dataset. For each household-reference quarter, 
we sum all rebate checks received by the household in that quarter to create our main rebate 
variable, Rebate. The pattern of reported rebates appears consistent with the limited 
information about the rebates that we have from other sources. The average value of Rebate, 
conditional on receiving at least one rebate check in the reference quarter, is $480. Of 
households receiving rebates, 27 percent report receiving $300 in rebates and 54 percent 
report receiving $600 in rebates.
12 The three-month reference period (July-September) for 
households interviewed in October 2001 covers the entire ten-week period during which the 




V. Economic Theory and Empirical Methodology 
The recent literature testing the PIH and related models has typically relied on the time-
series properties of the consumption Euler equation. Formally, according to the Euler 
                                                                                                                                                 
estimates often (and implausibly) imply that somewhat less money is spent on total expenditures than on 
nondurable goods. 
12The household rebate value need not be equal to $300 or $600. Households with 2000 tax liabilities 
smaller than $300 (or $600) could receive smaller rebates; households with multiple tax filers could receive 
multiple checks; taxpayers filing as heads of households could receive a $500 check. 
13Despite the potential for measurement error, this result is close to estimates of rebate receipt based on 
(unpublished) Treasury estimates: about 89.5m tax returns received a rebate while 23.5m did not receive a 
rebate, and about 22.9m households did not file and so also did not receive rebates (Office of Tax 
Analysis).   9
equation, households equate the marginal utility of consumption in the current period with 
the expected marginal utility of consumption in the next period:  
u’(Ci,t) = Et [(1-δt)
-1(1+rt)u’(C i,t+1)],     (1) 
where Ci,t is nondurable consumption by household i in period t; Et is the expectations 
operator; u’(.) is the marginal utility function, decreasing because of diminishing marginal 
benefits of consumption; 1+rt is the price of consumption in t relative to t+1; and δt is the 
discount rate. Starting with Robert E. Hall (1978), many papers assume a specific functional 
form for the utility function, or linearize equation (1), and exploit the time-series properties 
of the expectation error to estimate preference parameters and test the Euler equation. 
Motivated by the alternative hypothesis (which actually predates the null hypothesis) that 
households to some extent consume income when it arrives, the tests often focus on whether 
predictable changes in income are statistically significant when added to the Euler equation.  
While this approach to the Euler equation can estimate the model and test the null 
hypothesis of the PIH, it is not suitable for our purposes because it cannot estimate outside of 
the null hypothesis the causal impact of a predictable change in income on consumption 
growth.
14 Moreover, in the present context, the traditional approach to Euler equation 
estimation is inappropriate because there is insufficient time-series variation across our 
sample period to effectively exploit the usual time-series properties of the expectation error 
(Gary Chamberlain (1984), Souleles (2004)). By contrast, our approach does not rely on 
time-series asymptotics. We can directly identify and estimate the impact of the rebate on 
consumption growth using the fact that the randomized rebate receipt is uncorrelated with 
households’ expectation errors and any other unobserved heterogeneity.  
Consistent with specifications in the previous literature, our main estimating equation is 
Ci,t+1 - Ci,t  =   Σs β0s*months,i  +  β1'Xi,t   +  β2 Ri,t+1  +  ui,t+1 ,    (2) 
where C is either consumption expenditures or their log; month is a set of indicator variables 
for every period in the sample, used to absorb the seasonal variation in consumption 
expenditures as well as other concurrent macro factors; and X are control variables (here age 
and changes in family composition) included to absorb some of the preference-driven 
                                                 
14That is, this estimation method is based on the time-series properties of the expectation error under the 
assumption that the model is true and there is no effect of predictable income changes on consumption 
growth. Finding a statistically significant effect rejects the model, so a significant coefficient on the 
predictable change in income cannot be interpreted causally.   10
differences in the growth rate of consumption expenditures across households. Ri,t+1 
represents our key rebate variables, which take one of three forms: i) the total dollar amount 
of rebates received by household i in period t+1  (Rebatei,t+1); ii) a dummy variable 
indicating whether any rebate was received in t+1 (I(Rebatei,t+1>0)); and iii) a distributed lag 
of Rebate or I(Rebate>0).
15 If consumption expenditures are smoothed across rebate receipt, 
the null hypothesis under the PIH treating the rebates as pre-announced, then β2 should equal 
zero.
16 We correct the standard errors to allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-
household serial correlation. 
  In light of potential measurement error and sample-size limitations, in working with data 
on household expenditure it is generally important to use the largest possible sample and as 
much variation as possible in the independent variables. Hence we begin by utilizing all of 
the available information about the rebates received by each household, using Rebate as the 
key regressor. This variable includes variation in the magnitudes of the rebates received, 
which is not randomized. While this variation is analogous to that used in most previous tests 
of consumption smoothing, we can further investigate its validity. We progressively limit the 
variation that we utilize, until we are left with variation in just the timing of rebate receipt, 
conditional on receipt. This limited variation is guaranteed to be exogenous because it is 
randomized. However, given the structure of the data and the fact that the rebates were 
disbursed over only a three-month period, as we focus in on timing alone, we reduce the 
sample size and amount of effective variation that identifies the key parameter, β2. This 
                                                 
15In preliminary work we also used ∆Ri,t+1 as the key independent variable, to estimate the ‘instantaneous’ 
change in spending before and after rebate receipt. The distributed lag framework appropriately generalizes 
this idea in the presence of the lagged spending effects that we identified.  
16To be clear, this test of the PIH applies under even weaker informational assumptions than usual. For our 
purposes the relevant aspects of the tax cut can be modeled in stylized form as follows. Consider five 
periods t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t4 < t5, where t0 is earliest in time. Suppose that at time t0 the government 
announces the following tax policy: It will cut tax rates starting at a specified future time t1. However, it 
will not reduce withholding rates until later, at t5; meanwhile the reduction in tax liability before t5 will 
instead be implemented by sending consumers a rebate check. Suppose the government randomly divides 
the population into three groups, and sends the checks to each group at t2, t3, and t4, respectively. (Our 
regressor Ri,t+1 captures this staggered disbursement.)  
Notice that under the PIH, any wealth effect due to the tax cut should arise at t0, when the tax cut was 
announced. Even if, counter-factually, the tax cut were not announced in advance at t0, and instead was 
announced on implementation at t1, then the wealth effect should arise at t1. In neither case should the 
wealth effect be correlated with the actual rebate receipt at t2 through t4, whose timing was randomized. 
Also note that in this framework it does not matter how temporary or permanent consumers expect the tax 
cuts to be. In particular, we do not have to take a stand on whether consumers expected the tax cuts to 
actually “sunset” after ten years, as specified under the original Tax Act.    11
substantially reduces the power of our estimator. We accordingly use Hausman tests to test 
whether the discarded variation, such as the magnitudes of the rebates, can be taken to be 
exogenous even though it is not randomized, and so can be validly utilized in order to 
maximize power and efficiency.  
This identification strategy helps us avoid potential omitted variables bias and other 
confounding factors, at both the household and aggregate levels. By contrast, in most 
previous studies the income gain at issue (e.g., a windfall) was usually systematically related 
to various household characteristics, in ways that would often have been difficult to control 
for. For instance, suppose that high-income households, who are more likely to own stocks, 
receive larger windfalls (or larger predictable income gains); and that for other reasons the 
stock market happens to rise at the time of the windfall, leading high-income households to 
increase their consumption expenditures. In this case the estimated effect of the windfall on 
expenditure would be exaggerated by the stock market appreciation. During our sample 
period there were probably large changes in spending patterns induced by concurrent 
macroeconomic events, such as the recession, changes in monetary policy, the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, etc. Nonetheless, all these events, even if their impact is correlated with 
household characteristics, are uncorrelated with the randomly assigned date at which 
households received their tax rebates.  
We begin by estimating the short-run response of spending to the rebate, and then turn to 
the longer-run response. We later examine both the role of liquidity constraints, by 
interacting the rebate variables Ri,t+1 with indicators for illiquid households, and the response 
of different subcategories of spending, by changing the dependent variable in equation (2). 
 
VI. The Short-Run Response of Expenditure 
This section estimates the short-run change in consumption expenditures caused by 
rebate receipt, using just the contemporaneous rebate variables Rebatet+1 and I(Rebatet+1>0). 
These estimates of the contemporaneous effects of the rebate are nearly identical to the 
contemporaneous effects estimated in the following section after adding lagged rebate 
variables to equation (2). For ease of exposition, and in response to data limitations discussed 
below, we begin by focusing on the short-run effects alone.    12
In Table 2, the first three columns display the results of estimating equation (2) by OLS 
with the dollar change in consumption expenditures as the dependent variable and the 
contemporaneous amount of the rebate (Rebatet+1) as the key independent variable, using all 
available rebate data. The resulting estimates of β2 measure the average fraction of the rebate 
spent on each expenditure category, within the three-month reference-period in which the 
rebate was received. We find that, during the three-month period in which a rebate was 
received, relative to the previous three-month period, a household on average increased its 
expenditures on food by 11 percent of the rebate, its expenditures on non-durable goods 
strictly defined by 24 percent of the rebate, and its expenditures on non-durable goods 
(broadly defined) by 37 percent of the rebate. The latter two results are both economically 
and statistically significant, and counter to the PIH. 
These results identify the effect of a rebate from variation in both the timing of rebate 
receipt and the dollar amount of the rebate. While the variation in the rebate amount is 
possibly uncorrelated with the residual in equation (2), it is not purely random.  The amount 
of the rebate depends upon household characteristics, such as whether the household contains 
a married couple that filed jointly. Unlike most previous tests of consumption smoothing, 
which generally have no choice but to assume that the income change under investigation 
(the analogue to Ri,t+1) is exogenous, we can further explore this issue by progressively 
limiting the amount of variation that we utilize.  
The remaining columns of Table 2 use only variation in whether a rebate was received at 
all in a given period, not the dollar amount of rebates received. The second triplet of columns 
displays the results of estimating equation (2) using the indicator variable I(Rebatet+1>0). In 
this case, β2 measures the average dollar increase in expenditures caused by receipt of a 
rebate. During the three-month period in which a rebate was received, relative to the previous 
three-month period, households on average increased their expenditures on food by $51, their 
expenditures on non-durable goods strictly defined by $96, and their expenditures on non-
durable goods by $179. Compared to an average rebate of about $500, these results are quite 
consistent with those in the previous columns that include variation in the magnitude of the 
rebates received.  
To check that the functional form of our specification is not driving our findings, and to 
further help calibrate the size of the effect of the rebate, the third triplet of columns in Table   13
2 uses the change in log expenditures as the dependent variable. On average in the three-
month period in which a rebate is received, relative to the previous three-month period, 
consumption expenditures increased by 2.7 percent, 1.8 percent, and 3.2 across the three 
categories of expenditure. Again, given the average amount spent on each of these 
expenditure categories, these estimates are consistent with the previous estimates.
17 
Finally, since it is interesting to estimate a value interpretable as a marginal propensity to 
spend upon the rebate’s arrival, we estimate equation (2) by two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
We instrument for the rebate amount, Rebate, using the indicator variable, I(Rebate>0), 
along with the other independent variables. In this case, as in the first three columns, β2 
measures the fraction of the rebate that is spent within the three-month period of receipt.  As 
shown in the last triplet of columns in Table 2, the estimated marginal propensities to spend 
(11 percent, 20 percent, and 37 percent) remain statistically significant and are very close to 
those estimated without treating Rebate as potentially non-exogenous. This suggests that the 
variation in the rebate amount that was used in the first three columns can be taken to be 
exogenous. Comparing these results formally (the first three columns to the last three 
columns), a Hausman test does not reject the hypothesis that the variation in the rebate 
amount is exogenous, for each definition of consumption expenditures. 
Overall, the results across the various specifications in Table 2 are quite consistent, 
implying a statistically significant short-run effect of the rebate on spending. The estimated 
effect is also economically significant. As discussed in Section IX, these estimates imply a 
substantial increase in aggregate consumption expenditures. 
These results identify the effect on spending by comparing the behavior of households 
that received rebates at different times to the behavior of households that did not receive 
rebates at those times. Recall that some households did not receive rebates at all, in any 
period, so our results to this point implicitly use some information that comes from 
comparing households that received rebates to those that never received rebates. We 
investigate the role of this variation using a number of approaches. 
                                                 
17Using average levels of expenditures and rebates, the percent changes in spending in the third triplet of 
columns implies dollar spending changes and propensities to consume of $40 and 0.084 for food, $56 and 
0.12 for strictly non-durable goods, and $131 and 0.27 for non-durable goods, again broadly consistent with 
the other columns.   14
First, we directly control for rebate receipt, by adding to equation (2) a separate intercept 
for households that received a rebate in some sample reference quarter, I(Total Rebates >0). 
This allows the expenditure growth of rebate recipients to differ from that of non-recipients. 
In this case the main regressor I(Rebatet+1>0) captures only high-frequency variation in the 
timing of rebate receipt -- receipt in quarter t+1 in particular -- conditional on receipt in some 
quarter. In Table 3, Panel A shows that this approach has little effect on our baseline 
conclusions. The separate intercept I(Total Rebates >0) is never statistically significant. 
Hence the expenditure growth of rebate recipients is on average similar to that of non-
recipients. Further, in each regression, the point estimates of the effect of the rebate 
(I(Rebatet+1>0)) are actually somewhat larger than before. That is, even controlling for 
whether a household ever received a rebate, spending significantly increases in the particular 
quarter of rebate receipt.  
Our second approach is more severe. We exclude from our sample the households that 
did not receive a rebate (or, more precisely and conservatively, those that are not known to 
have received a rebate using the available data).
18 We also exclude the relatively few 
households that received late rebates due to filing late tax returns in the previous year. Even 
though the timing of these rebates is unlikely to be endogenous, it was not randomized.
19 The 
advantage of this approach is that it identifies the response of spending from only purely 
randomized variation in the timing of rebate receipt conditional on receipt. The cost of this 
approach is that it leads to a substantial loss of power due to the resulting decline in sample 
size and effective variation. Recall that the CE rebate module was in the field through 
December 2001. Hence β2 is now identified from only two groups of rebate-recipients: those 
with CE interviews in August (covering about 3 percent of non-late rebates) and in 
November (29 percent); and those with interviews in September (19 percent) and in 
December (19 percent). We lose all information regarding the sizable number of rebate 
recipients interviewed in October (31 percent). Accordingly, we also drop these households 
                                                 
18 For example, consider households whose last CE interview is in September 2001. Even if they report no 
rebates in their reference period, which covers June-August 2001, we cannot tell whether they received a 
rebate after August. Thus we drop all interviews of such households. 
19 We exclude observations for which Rebate includes rebates received in November or December; but not 
rebates received in October, since rebates mailed in September (the end of the randomized disbursement 
period) can arrive in October.    15
from the sample.
20 As a result of these exclusions, the sample size is only about one-third of 
its original size.
   
Panel B of Table 3 shows that, consistent with the reduction in power, statistical 
uncertainty rises substantially, such that a 95 percent confidence interval contains both no 
rebate response and much larger responses than our baseline estimates in Table 2. With the 
caveat that they are statistically insignificant, the point estimates are somewhat lower than 
before, but still show an economically significant impact of the rebate on spending.
21 As 
formally confirmed by Hausman tests, these estimates are not statistically different from our 
baseline estimates: in no column can we reject the hypothesis that the coefficient in this 
restricted subsample is the same as the corresponding coefficient estimated using the baseline 
sample in Table 2. While these Hausman tests have limited power, as before they suggest 
that the greater variation in the baseline sample can be taken to be exogenous.
22  
Overall, the results of these extensions provide little evidence against our baseline 
estimates and support our conclusion that the rebates had an economically significant short-
run effect on spending. We now turn to estimating the longer-run effects, and subsequently 
study how the effects differ across households and subcategories of expenditure. Because 
these extensions are even more demanding of the data than the short-run effects estimated so 
far, we return to using all of the households available in the baseline sample. 
 
 
                                                 
20 That is, given the time that the tax module was in the field, this approach effectively identifies the impact 
of the rebate from only the behavior of households that both have consecutive interviews covering the 
period of randomized rebate disbursement, and report a rebate only in the earlier interview or only in the 
later interview. We lose all information from October interviews because these households were surveyed 
only once about the rebate and so their indicator for rebate receipt, I(Rebatet+1), is collinear with the 
October month dummy, and so has little effect on the estimated coefficient on the indicator. 
21 We dropped the late rebates in order to be conservative and limit our variation to just the variation that 
was randomized. However, as noted above the lateness of a rebate is a priori unlikely to be endogenous 
since it depends on a household filing a late tax return in the previous year. Hence we also estimated our 
model excluding from the baseline sample of Table 2 only the households that did not receive rebates 
(without excluding the late rebates). While the results are statistically insignificant for the reasons just 
discussed, the resulting estimates of β2 remain closer to those found in Table 2, e.g., β2 = 0.30 for 
nondurable goods using 2SLS. If instead we exclude only the late rebates (without excluding the non-
recipients), the corresponding β2 remains both statistically and economically significant at 0.30.  
22 Additional support regarding the validity of these results comes from Agarwal, Liu and Souleles (2004), 
who find statistically significant responses of credit-card spending to rebate receipt. As noted above, they 
identify rebate receipt using just an indicator for the corresponding digit of the card-holders’ SSNs, 
variation which is purely exogenous. That is, they do not use variation in the magnitude of rebates received, 
nor in any difference between rebate recipients and non-recipients.   16
VII. The Longer-Run Response of Expenditures 
  Relative to the PIH, the estimated fraction of the rebate spent in the first quarter of receipt 
is large. But since this fraction is substantially less than one, it remains an open question as to 
what happens to spending in subsequent quarters.  
In Table 4, Panel A shows the results of estimating our main specifications when we 
include the first lag of the rebate variable, Rt, as an additional regressor. First, note that the 
presence of the lagged variable does not alter our previous conclusions about the 
contemporaneous impact of the rebate.  The coefficients on Rt+1 are quite similar to those in 
Table 2. Second, the receipt of a rebate causes a change in spending one quarter later (i.e., 
from the three-month period of rebate receipt to the next three-month period) that is negative 
and smaller in absolute magnitude than the contemporaneous change. The net effect of the 
rebate on the level of spending in the later quarter is given by the sum of the negative lagged 
coefficients (on Rt) and the positive contemporaneous coefficients (on Rt+1). While the 
lagged coefficients are typically not statistically significant themselves, for nondurable goods 
the net effect is often significantly positive. This implies that, after increasing in the three-
month period of rebate receipt, spending remains high (statistically significantly greater than 
before receipt) in the subsequent three-month period. For example, the second column shows 
that expenditures on nondurable goods rise by 39% of the rebate in the quarter of receipt. The 
expenditure change in the next quarter is -8%, so that expenditures in the second three-month 
period are still higher on net than before the arrival of the rebate by 39%-8% ≈ 30% (due to 
rounding) of the rebate. This net 30% result is significant at the 95 percent level.  
Accordingly, the cumulative change in expenditures on nondurable goods over both three-
month periods is estimated to be 39% + 30% = 69% of the rebate, and is statistically 
significant (bottom row of Panel A). Similar calculations for the final column using 2SLS 
suggest that nondurable expenditures in the second three-month period are higher on net by 
27% of the rebate (statistically significant at the 7% level), with a significant cumulative 
change over both periods of 66% of the rebate. 
To estimate whether the rebate increases consumption expenditures for a longer period, 
we also add a second lag of the rebate variable (Rt-1) to our regression. To do so we extend 
the sample period of our data by three months by adding interviews from April through June 
2002 from the 2002 CE data.    17
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the additional data and regressor do not change our 
previous conclusions about the impact of the rebate on expenditures in the contemporaneous 
three-month period or the subsequent three-month period (using Rt+1 and Rt). More 
interestingly, the coefficients on the second lag of the rebate variable are all negative, 
implying that expenditures continue to decline following their initial increase upon rebate 
receipt. However, these coefficients are all imprecisely estimated. The net level of 
expenditures in the second three-month period following rebate receipt is no longer 
statistically significantly different from the level before receipt. For example, for nondurable 
goods in the second column, expenditures in the second three-month period are higher than 
before rebate receipt by only 16% net of the rebate (≈ .39% -.10% -.12%, with rounding), 
and this figure is not nearly statistically significant. (The corresponding net effect in the final 
column is only 6%, and is also statistically insignificant.) Further, while the cumulative share 
of the rebate spent during all three periods (bottom row of Panel B) is still large and 
sometimes statistically different from zero (only in the second column), it is not significantly 
different from the share that we estimated was spent during the first two periods (Panel A), 
and the statistical uncertainty of the three-period estimate is much larger.  For example, in the 
second column of Panel B, the 95 percent confidence interval for the cumulative response of 
nondurable goods over all three three-month periods extends from 5 percent of the rebate to 
162 percent of the rebate. 
In sum, the pattern of coefficients suggests a large increase in expenditure at the time of 
rebate receipt, then a decaying but still substantial effect in the subsequent quarter or two. 
Households spent about two thirds of their rebates on nondurable consumption goods in the 
quarter of receipt and subsequent three months. Since the net response in the second three–
month period after rebate receipt is much smaller and imprecisely estimated, the balance of 
the paper focuses on the contemporaneous rebate variable and its first lag, using our baseline 
data sample. 
 
VIII. Differences in Responses Across Households and Goods  
This section analyzes heterogeneity in the response to the rebate, across different types of 
households and different subcategories of consumption goods. While it is independently 
interesting to know who bought what with the rebates, the results also provide some evidence   18
as to why household expenditure responded to the rebate. For brevity, we report only results 
from the 2SLS specification, instrumenting the rebate and its lag (and any interaction terms) 
with the corresponding indicator variables for rebate receipt (and their interactions, along 
with the other independent variables). 
The presence of liquidity constraints is a leading explanation for why household spending 
might increase in response to a previously expected increase in income.
23 To investigate this 
explanation, we test whether liquid or illiquid households were more likely to increase their 
spending upon arrival of a rebate. Households with low liquid wealth may be unable or 
unwilling to increase their spending prior to the rebate arrival. On the other hand, households 
with high liquid wealth may find the costs of not smoothing consumption across the arrival 
of the rebate to be small.
24  
Expanding equation (2), we interact the intercept, rebate and lagged rebate variables with 
indicator variables (Low and High) based on various household characteristics (all from  
households’ first CE interview). We use three different variables to identify households that 
are potentially liquidity constrained: age, income (family income before taxes), and liquid 
assets (the sum of balances in checking and saving accounts). While liquid assets is the most 
directly relevant of the three variables for measuring liquidity constraints, it is the least well 
measured and the most often missing in the CE data, so we start with the other two variables. 
For each variable, we split households into three groups, Low, Middle, and High, with the 
cutoffs between groups chosen to include about a third of the rebate recipients in each group.  
We begin by testing whether the propensity to spend the rebate differs by age. Because 
young households typically have low liquid wealth and high income growth, and because old 
households may be living pension check to pension check, both young and old households 
might be disproportionately likely to be liquidity constrained. In Table 5, in the first pair of 
columns, Low refers to young households (younger than 40) and High refers to older 
households (older than 55), and the coefficients on these variables represent differences 
relative to the households in the (baseline) middle age group. While the point estimates 
                                                 
23Precautionary motives can generate observationally similar results. See Tullio Jappelli (1990), Stephen P. 
Zeldes (1989, 1989a), Christopher D. Carroll (1992), Wilcox (1989), and Stephens (2003). 
24See the arguments of Ricardo J. Caballero (1995), Parker (1999), Christopher A. Sims (2001), and 
Ricardo Reiss (2004).   19
suggest that both young and old households spent somewhat more of the rebate than the 
typical (middle-aged) household, most of these differences are not statistically significant. 
The second pair of columns in Table 5 tests for differences in spending across income 
groups. Low income households spent a much larger fraction of their rebate during the three-
month period of receipt than the typical (middle-income) household. For nondurable goods, 
these differences are both statistically and economically significant. In the three months in 
which the rebate arrived, low income households spent about 62 percentage points more of 
their rebate on nondurable goods than typical, about 75 percent of their rebate in absolute 
terms. Further, based on the point estimates, high income households also seem to have spent 
a somewhat greater fraction of the rebate on receipt, although this difference is not 
statistically significant. For both high and low income households, the net lagged effects are 
not statistically significantly different than typical. 
The last pair of columns tests for differences by liquid assets. The conclusions are the 
same as those for income, despite the smaller sample size due to missing asset values. In 
particular, households with few liquid assets spent a significantly greater share of their 
rebates than the typical household. Based on the point estimates high liquid wealth 
households also spent somewhat more than typical, but again this difference is not 
significant.  
In sum, we find evidence that households with low income and low liquid wealth 
consumed more of their rebates than typical, which is consistent with the existence of 
liquidity constraints. These households are consuming most of their rebates soon after 
receipt, not saving much of them to smooth expenditure in future periods. This could be 
either because they expect to have higher income in the near future (e.g., due to an economic 
recovery) or because they have a high propensity to consume one-time or highly liquid 
funds.
25, 26 
What did households buy with their rebates? Table 6 displays the results of estimating 
our main dynamic regression (including Rebate and one lag) with different dependent 
variables measuring expenditure across the different subcategories within nondurable goods. 
                                                 
25Buffer stock models can generate large propensities to consume in response to transitory income gains. 
Adding hyperbolic discounting of the sort studied by David Laibson, George-Marios Angeletos, Andrea 
Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman, and Stephen Weinberg (2001) can generate even larger short-run responses. 
26In unreported analysis we also considered other demographic characteristics. For instance, we did not find 
statistically significant differences in the response across education groups or marital status.   20
Few of the resulting estimates are statistically significant. For these narrow subcategories of 
goods there is much more variability in the dependent variable that is unrelated to the rebate 
regressor. Our previous results, by summing the subcategories into broader categories of 
nondurable goods, averaged out much of this unrelated variability (such as for example 
whether a trip to the supermarket happened to fall just inside or outside the expenditure 
reference-period). 
Based on the point estimates there is some (statistically insignificant) evidence that 
expenditures on food, both at home and away from home, respond to rebate receipt. 
Expenditures on food away from home initially rise by more than their share in nondurable 
expenditures and our previous estimates would suggest. Within the remainder of nondurable 
goods, the point estimates suggest larger responses (relative to their shares in nondurable 
expenditure) in personal care (and miscellaneous items), apparel (and apparel services), 
health expenditures, and reading materials, although again we note that the statistical 
significance of these results is low. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
This paper finds significant evidence that households spent much of their 2001 income 
tax rebates. Specifically, households spent about 20-40 percent of their rebates on non-
durable consumption goods during the three-month period in which the rebates arrived, 
depending on the specification. We also find additional, smaller but still substantial, lagged 
effects on spending. Roughly two-thirds of the rebates were spent during the quarter of 
receipt and subsequent three-month period. The expenditure responses are largest for 
households with relatively low liquid wealth and low income, which is consistent with 
liquidity constraints.  
What do these results imply in terms of the economic stimulus provided by the rebate 
checks? In aggregate, the rebates totaled 38 billion dollars, or about 2.2 percent of aggregate 
personal consumption expenditures (PCE), and 7.5 percent of nondurable PCE, in the third 
quarter of 2001. Applying our estimated propensities to spend from Table 4 (Panel A), this 
implies that the receipt of the tax rebates directly raised total PCE by about 0.8 percent in the 
third quarter of 2001 and 0.6 percent in the fourth quarter, and raised nondurable PCE by 2.9 
percent and 2.0 percent in the third and fourth quarters. Since these calculations do not   21
include any potential effect on durable goods or any multiplier effects, the full impact of the 
rebates on the economy is possibly even larger. On the other hand, these calculations assume 
that the rebates did not increase prices, but only real consumption expenditure. 
While we measure the causal impact of the rebates using cross-sectional variation, 
without using movements in aggregate consumption expenditures, the behavior of both 
aggregate consumption expenditure and aggregate saving data is broadly consistent with our 
findings. Figure 1 shows the growth rate of real total and nondurable PCE in the quarters 
surrounding the rebate disbursement. In the first half of 2001, the economy was in a 
recession, and both the latter half of 2000 and the first half of 2001 had low PCE growth. 
After the rebates were mailed out, PCE growth rose substantially and the recession ended in 
November of 2001. This is consistent with our results. Further, the aggregate data also 
suggest that the rebates were not all spent immediately. The personal saving rate rose from 
1.9 percent and 1.2 percent in the first two quarters of 2001 to 3.4 percent in the third quarter 
when the rebates were mailed out, a pattern and magnitude consistent with households 
initially saving about two-thirds of the rebates (see Shapiro and Slemrod (2003; 2002, 
forthcoming)). The household saving rate then fell to 0.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 
2001 and rose to 2.7 percent in the first two quarters of 2002. The behavior of the saving rate 
in the third and fourth quarters of 2001 is consistent with our finding of a substantial lagged 
effect of the rebate on spending.
27  
While we focused on consumers’ response to the receipt of the rebates, we cannot 
directly estimate whether there was an earlier response in anticipation of the rebate. The 
passage of the Tax Act itself cannot be separated from aggregate effects captured by our time 
dummies, such as seasonality. Moreover, there is no single point in time at which a tax cut 
went from being entirely unexpected to being entirely expected; rather, expectations of some 
tax cut grew over a long period, starting at least as early as the 2000 election. Nonetheless, 
our results suggest that the anticipatory response is likely to be small, since we already find 
large responses at the time the rebate checks arrived. 
                                                 
27Shapiro and Slemrod note that some of the decline in saving in 2001:Q4 is due to increased spending on 
durable goods, particularly cars. But since durable goods are a small share of total consumption 
expenditures, the rise in the saving rate was still caused mostly by changes in other, nondurable 
components of consumption expenditures.   22
We conclude with a caveat. While the 2001 tax rebates stimulated consumer spending, 
without knowing the full structural model underlying these results, we cannot conclude that 
future tax rebates will have quantitatively the same effect. In 2001 the rebates were part of 
countercyclical stabilization policy. The spending response to other tax rebates may differ 
across time and circumstances. For instance, the response might be smaller outside of a 
recession or given a different situation for household balance sheets and liquidity.   23
Appendix A: CE Tax Rebate Survey Instrument 
 
INTRO:  Earlier this year a Federal law was passed cutting income tax rates and 
expanding certain credits and deductions.  This year many households will receive a tax 
rebate check in the mail.  
 
1.  Since the 1
st of (month, 3 months ago) have you (or any members of your CU 
[consumer unit]) received a tax rebate? 
1.YES—go to 2 
2. NO—end of interview 
 
2.  For each check received: 
 
  check1 check2 check3 check4 check5 




   __ __ 
 
   __ __ 
 
  __ __ 
 
   __ __ 
 
   __ __ 














3.  For Interview number 2 and 5 and New Consumer Units: Did you already report the 
amount of this rebate in Section 22 , question 13, which asks about tax refunds? 
 
   24
Appendix B: CE Sample and Construction of Rebate Variables 
We first construct a rebate variable from the raw data from question 2 of the CE tax 
rebate module (Appendix A). We then use the flags and other information to set the sample 
so that observations for which we are unsure about the validity of the rebate variable are not 
used. The variable Rebate is the sum of all rebates reported during the three-month 
expenditure reference period. If any of these magnitudes is missing, Rebate is set to missing.  
Second, to maximize sample size, we use some rebate information from later interviews 
to fill in missing data in earlier interviews. Specifically, for interviews with no raw tax data, 
and for which the subsequent interview reports a rebate as having been received during the 
first interview’s reference period, we treat the later interview’s information as valid. (In 
particular, this completes the data for some of the households that were interviewed in early 
August before the tax rebate module was in the field.) Third, we use some rebate information 
from earlier interviews to create rebate measures for the reference period of the subsequent 
interview. For example, occasionally the first interview with tax data records a rebate 
received within the interview month itself (i.e., after the corresponding reference period), and 
the following interview reports no rebate for that same month. We treat this as a valid rebate 
response for the second reference period, since it is more likely to have been received then. 
Finally, the first interview sometimes reports no rebate, but the second interview records a 
rebate received during the first interview's reference quarter. In this case we assume that the 
household made a recall error in the second (more distant) interview and that the timing of 
the rebate reported in that interview is off. We therefore treat the rebate as if it occurred in 
the second interview reference-period if there is no other rebate already recorded for that 
period.  
Rebate is set to zero for all observations covering reference periods ending June 2001 or 
earlier and starting October 2001 or later (unless a late rebate was reported) – periods during 
which the rebate questions were not on the CE survey. 
We drop a rebate observation when: a) the lead-in question 1 states that a rebate was not 
received but there is a rebate reported in question 2; b) the lead-in question states that a 
rebate was received but there is no rebate reported for any month; c) there is a valid positive 
rebate amount but the associated month-of-receipt is either missing or flagged as invalid; d) a 
rebate is reported as received in a certain month but the rebate amount is missing, invalid or 
zero. 
We use the following definitions of variables. Age is the average age of the head and 
spouse when the household is a married couple, otherwise it is just the age of the head. The 
number of children is calculated as the number of members of the household younger than 
18.  
Following Lusardi (1996), expenditures on nondurable goods strictly defined include 
expenditures on food (away from home, at home and alcoholic beverages), on utilities (fuels 
and public services) and household operations, on public transportation and gas and motor 
oil, on personal care, on tobacco, and on miscellaneous goods. Nondurable goods (broadly 
defined) adds expenditures on apparel goods and services, on health care expenditures 
(excluding payments by employers or insurers), and on reading materials. 
Turning to the sample, we omit observations missing any of the key data that we use in 
our regressions. Our sample omits the bottom one percent of nondurable consumption 
expenditures in levels (after adjusting for family size and allowing for a time trend), since 
this data implies implausibly small consumption expenditures. Finally, we drop household   25
observations that report living in student housing, that report age less than 21 or greater than 
85, that report age changing by more than one or a negative amount between quarters, or that 
report changes in the number of children or adults greater than three in absolute magnitude. 
When we split the sample based on income, we drop households flagged as incompletely 
reporting income.   26
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  Food 1,482 1,115 0 24,799
  Strictly nondurables 3,168 3,984 175 284,216
  Nondurables 4,149 4,481 385 300,155
Change in Expenditures on:
  Food 0 936 -16,392 22,360
  Strictly nondurables 30 1,684 -20,363 49,860
  Nondurables 62 2,052 -31,884 52,978
Change in:
  Number of Adults 0.0 0.3 -3.0 3.0
  Number of Children 0.0 0.2 -3.0 3.0
Age 50.2 16.6 21 85
Rebate  86.8 199.0 0 1,500
Rebate | Rebate>0 480.0 173.8 2 1,500
I(Rebate>0) 0.181 0.385 0 1
Income (N=9,443) 47,020 36,806 -500 320,800
Liquid Assets (N=6,060) 7,877 16,661 -17,000 136,200
Panel B: Distribution of Positive Rebate Values
Number of Percent of






Panel C: Means of Rebate Variables by Interview Period
Three month period Rebate I(Rebate)     Rebate| Rebate>0
May - July, 2001 30.6 0.07 444.7
June - Aug, 2001 152.5 0.33 467.7
July - Sept, 2001 279.6 0.57 489.5
Aug - Oct, 2001 254.7 0.52 487.8
Sept - Nov, 2001 167.1 0.36 470.3
Panel A: Sample statistics (N=13,066 observations)
Note: based on sample for baseline regression using nondurable goods (Table 2). Table 2: The contemporaneous response of expenditures to the tax rebate
Dependent ∆C ∆C ∆lnC ∆C


































method: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Rebate 0.109 0.239 0.373 0.108 0.202 0.375
(0.056) (0.115) (0.135) (0.058) (0.112) (0.136)
I(Rebate>0) 51.5 96.2 178.8 2.72 1.76 3.16
(27.6) (53.6) (65.0) (1.36) (1.05) (1.02)
Age 0.570 0.449 1.165 0.552 0.391 1.106 0.035 0.005 0.023 0.569 0.424 1.166
(0.320) (0.550) (0.673) (0.318) (0.548) (0.670) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.320) (0.549) (0.671)
Change in 130.3 285.8 415.8 131.1 287.7 418.6 6.16 6.22 7.55 130.3 286.2 415.7
  adults (57.8) (90.0) (102.8) (57.8) (90.2) (102.9) (2.08) (1.58) (1.50) (57.7) (90.0) (102.7)
Change in  73.7 98.3 178.4 74.0 98.7 179.2 3.99 3.73 4.59 73.7 98.3 178.4
  children (45.3) (82.4) (98.3) (45.3) (82.5) (98.3) (2.36) (1.66) (1.66) (45.3) (82.5) (98.3)
N 13,066 13,066 13,066 13,066 13,066 13,066 13,007 13,066 13,066 13,066 13,066 13,066
Notes: All regressions include a full set of month dummies. Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and 
heteroskedasticity. The third triplet of three columns is multiplied by 100 so as to report a percent change. The last three columns report results from two-

















 method: OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Rebate 0.281 0.425 0.244 0.444
(0.136) (0.162) (0.141) (0.173)
I(Rebate>0) 1.99 3.67
(1.37) (1.33)
I(Total Rebates>0) -30.6 -37.3 -0.28 -0.63 -24.8 -40.4
(30.0) (36.4) (0.69) (0.68) (31.8) (38.7)
Estimation
 method: OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Rebate 0.153 0.247 0.079 0.189





Dollar change in Percent change in Dollar change in
Panel A: All households (N=13,066), Controlling for Rebate Receipt
Panel B: Only households receiving rebates (N=4,662)
Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of 
children, the age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. Reported standard errors are 
adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The final pair of columns 
report results from two-stage least squares regressions where I(Rebate>0) with the other regressors 
are used as instruments for Rebate. I(Total Rebates>0) is an indicator for households that received a 
rebate in some sample quarter, whereas I(Rebate>0) indicates receipt in the contemporaneous quarter 
























method: OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Rebate t+1 or I(Rebate t+1>0) 0.248 0.386 1.86 3.29 0.208 0.386
(0.114) (0.135) (1.05) (1.01) (0.111) (0.135)
Rebate t or I(Rebate t>0) -0.156 -0.082 -1.89 -1.44 -0.190 -0.113
(first lag) (0.099) (0.115) (1.06) (1.02) (0.101) (0.118)
Implied cumulative fraction
of rebate spent over both  0.340 0.691 NA NA 0.226 0.659
three-month periods (0.219) (0.260) (0.212) (0.262)
Estimation
method: OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Rebate t+1 or I(Rebate t+1>0) 0.247 0.386 1.85 3.29 0.208 0.386
(0.114) (0.135) (1.04) (1.01) (0.111) (0.135)
Rebate t or I(Rebate t>0) -0.172 -0.099 -2.17 -1.72 -0.212 -0.139
(first lag) (0.097) (0.113) (1.05) (1.01) (0.099) (0.115)
Rebate t-1 or I(Rebate t-1>0) -0.034 -0.123 -0.32 -1.67 -0.055 -0.191
(second lag) (0.121) (0.141) (1.23) (1.21) (0.122) (0.142)
Implied cumulative fraction
of rebate spent over all 0.363 0.837 NA NA 0.145 0.690
three three-month periods (0.323) (0.391) (0.316) (0.397)
Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of 
children, age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. Standard errors are adjusted for 
arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The final pair of columns report results 
from two-stage least squares regressions where I(Rebate>0) and its lags, along with the other 
regressors, are used as instruments for Rebate and its lags.
Dollar change in Dollar change in Percent change in
Panel B: two lags of rebate and extended sample (N=15,022)
Dependent Variable:
Rebate I(Rebate) Rebate
Panel A: lagged rebate and baseline sample (N=12,730)
∆Ct+1 ∆lnCt+1 ∆Ct+1Table 5: The propensity to spend across different households
Dependent variable: ∆Ct+1 












Fraction of rebate spent
in first three-month period
Rebate t+1 0.222 0.326 0.050 0.130 -0.284 -0.243
(Middle group) (0.177) (0.211) (0.163) (0.185) (0.177) (0.217)
Rebate t+1*Low -0.035 0.071 0.317 0.624 0.569 0.876
(Low group difference) (0.211) (0.239) (0.224) (0.266) (0.239) (0.284)
Rebate t+1*High -0.038 0.109 0.274 0.255 0.312 0.404
(High group difference) (0.263) (0.302) (0.251) (0.291) (0.299) (0.364)
Change in fraction spent
in second three-month period
Rebate t -0.296 -0.291 -0.080 -0.067 0.201 0.283
(Middle group) (0.132) (0.159) (0.148) (0.172) (0.226) (0.261)
Rebate t*Low 0.301 0.465 -0.052 -0.059 -0.290 -0.292
(Low group difference) (0.183) (0.218) (0.198) (0.248) (0.253) (0.302)
Rebate t*High 0.018 0.092 -0.309 -0.243 -0.659 -0.670
(High group difference) (0.231) (0.273) (0.235) (0.275) (0.298) (0.358)
Low intercept -110.6 -113.93 -20.8 -26.92 -56.3 -80.5
(50.5) (59.60) (35.2) (41.62) (37.5) (47.0)
High intercept 131.7 151.28 -45.3 -31.51 15.3 -8.5
(79.4) (93.60) (52.3) (65.22) (56.3) (73.8)
N 12,730 12,730 9,233 9,233 5,951 5,951
Interaction: Age Interaction: Income Interaction: Liquid Assets




Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the 
age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. All results are from two-stage least squares regressions 
where I(Rebate>0) and its lag and interactions, along with the other regressors, are used as instruments for 
Rebate and its lag and interactions. Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household 
correlations and heteroskedasticity. All sample splits are chosen to include about 1/3 of rebate recipients in each 
grouping.
High: age > 55Table 6: The propensity to spend on different categories of goods
Panel A: Food
Dependent variable: ∆Ct+1


















Average share of 
Nondurable Goods 0.28 0.09 0.02 0.23 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.01
Rebate t+1 0.054 0.045 0.004 0.036 0.067 0.002 0.000 0.074 0.098 0.005
(0.038) (0.038) (0.011) (0.027) (0.058) (0.044) (0.007) (0.044) (0.040) (0.004)
Rebate t 0.005 -0.039 0.003 -0.005 -0.070 -0.079 -0.004 0.085 -0.009 0.000
(0.038) (0.046) 0.011 (0.025) (0.052) (0.040) (0.008) (0.033) (0.040) (0.005)
Implied cumulative
fraction spent over 0.113 0.051 0.010 0.067 0.063 -0.075 -0.005 0.234 0.188 0.010
both 3-month periods (0.084) (0.078) (0.022) (0.056) (0.105) (0.083) (0.016) (0.090) (0.082) (0.008)
Panel C: Additional nondurable goods Panel B: Additional nondurable goods (strict)
Notes: N=12,730 for all regressions. All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, age of the 
household, and a full set of month dummies. Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. All 
results are from two-stage least squares regressions where I(Rebate) and its lag, along with the other regressors, are used as instruments for Rebate and its 
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